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The development of the construction of the European Union has introduced new concepts, 
including multilevel governance, and multilevel parliamentary system. One way to render 
the European Union more democratically would be the development of a multilevel 
parliamentary system. Draft European legislative acts shall be justified with regard to the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in the EU legislation. The protocol No 2 of 
the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) introduced a mechanism of subsidiarity scrutiny by national 
parliaments known as ex ante “early warning system”, which increases the involvement 
of national parliaments in the EU policy-making process. The study presents the main 
features of subsidiarity monitoring and how the practice has evolved. Furthermore, it 
focuses on the two-level structure in the emerging a multilevel parliamentary system 
that is the supranational level, embodied by the European Parliament and the national 
level, represented by 28 national parliaments. The findings examine a trend towards the 
extension of the EU multilevel parliamentary field to including EU regional parliaments 
of the federal and regionalised states, and local and regional bodies of unitary states. 
KEYWORDS: National and regional parliaments, Principle of subsidiarity, EU 
legislation, Treaty of Lisbon, Early Warning System, Democratic legitimacy, Committee 
of the Regions.
INTRODUCTION 
The development of the construction and decision-making of the European 
Union has introduced new concepts; among them the concepts of a multilevel 
governance and multilevel parliamentary system. The debates on the multilevel 
parliamentary system relates to a number of developments within the EU.
With no conventional EU-level „government” making policy, „governance” 
has emerged as a widely embraced concept for capturing the policy-making 
processes, which has led to the extension of this concept into a „multilevel 
governance”. As a result of the „early warning mechanism” national parliaments 
with a pre-legislative intervention device have the potential to enhance 
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participation of national policy-making bodies in the checking of subsidiarity. The 
legal changes brought along by the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) encourage national 
parliaments to jointly forge a new mode in the EU institutional architecture.
Multilevel governance emerged within the context of European studies as 
an alternative approach to state-centric models of the European integration 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Bache and Flinders, 2004). The European Union is 
not a state in the traditional European sense in which policy-making elites are 
held accountable by citizens for their public policies and actions. It represents a 
new form of supranational authority which is based on strong national systems. 
It is a critical issue of how the EU policy-making is being shaped in an open and 
legitimate way through an EU wide public debate.
In the past decades political sciences have increasingly been focusing on the 
issue of statehood, the changing role of nation states in the process of European 
integration and globalisation. The intergovernmental theories emphasise the 
role of the nation state in integration process, and argue that nation-states act 
according to their national interest. In this view, national governments as ultimate 
decision makers, devolving limited authority to supranational institutions to 
achieve specific policy goals while decisions result from bargaining among these 
governments (Hoffmann, 1966; Taylor, 1982; Moravcsik, 1993). 
With no conventional EU-level „government” making policy, governance has 
emerged as a widely embraced concept for capturing the policy-making processes 
and it is generally seen as an alternative to the monolithic and hierarchic concept 
of government in which powers are transferred from national to EU level.
The process of governing through governance, therefore, is complex 
which has led to the extension of this concept into „multilevel governance” or 
multilayered governance (Hooghe, 1996; Marks, 1993; Scharpf, 1994; Wallace 
W., 1994.) Representatives of multilevel governance contend that the EU cannot 
be properly understood by using the nation state criteria and suggest a new form 
of governance where decision-making competencies are shared by actors at 
different governmental levels rather than monopolized by national governments.
There are some differences between multilevel governance and other 
integration theories. The multilevel governance perspective is an addition 
to the theoretical attempts to understand the EU whose roots are found in 
neofunctionalist theories. Proponents of neofuncionalist (Cameron, 1992; 
Olson, 1982; Rhodes, 1997) and transnationalist approaches (Wallace, 2000) 
argue against Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist approach which derives 
from the theoretical argument that European integration does not render the 
nation-state obsolete but on the contrary strengthens it. Of all the approaches, 
neo-federalism comes closest to realizing the spectre of the withering away 
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and replacement of the nation state by a new, supranational organization with 
recognizable state features (Pinder, 1985). 
The multilevel governance breaks the grey zone between intergovernmentalism 
and supranationalism (Gal and Brie, 2011, p. 285). The extensive literature on 
multilevel governance asserts that European-level policy-making competences 
are no longer monopolized by national governments. The authority and policy-
making influence are shared by actors at different levels: supranational, national, 
regional and local (Hooghe and Marks, 2001).
Multilevel governance does not address the sovereignty of states directly, 
but simply states that a multilevel structure is created also by subnational 
and supranational actors. From a governance perspective, the impact of EU 
legislation is the key to understand the relation between the supranational and 
subnational levels. Debates concern the Europeanization that implies adapting 
subnational systems of governance to a European political centre and Europe-
wide norms. Europeanization has modified the shared notions of governance 
in the EU Member States by inserting the (sub-state) regions into a complex 
set of layers of governance (Jeffrey, 1997; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2009; 
Keating and Hooghe, 1994; Hooghe, Marks and Blank, 1996). The third level 
of government is emerging to assume a role in the growing importance of the 
subnational input into the EU policy-making process alongside the supranational 
and national levels.
European governance and administration is characterized as a system 
of rules that affect the way in which powers are exercised. Central states are 
relinquishing authority to supranational and subnational authorities, but what 
kinds of jurisdictional architecture might emerge (Hooghe and Marks, 2003, 
p. 241)? The study’s starting point is that the resulting governance system has 
been far more elaborated on the side of the executive than on the side of the 
legislative. The European Parliament takes part in the adoption of the Union’s 
legislation, for which it has its individual legal basis, while for long the national 
parliaments had only restricted possibilities to be involved in the legislation 
process of the EU. The starting point of the study is the roles and functions of 
the supranational, national and subnational parliamentary controls over the EU 
decision-making process. The article tries to find the answer for the question that 
democratic legitimacy in multilevel systems inherently needs a multilevel type 
of organisation where decision-making involves a great variety of actors, and not 
only executives, but legislatives as well.
The European Commission launched a significant reform of governance in 
the White Paper on European Governance (2001), which is still one of the prime 
reference points in the discussion of governance in the EU. 
197Slovak Journal of Political Sciences, Volume 18, 2018, No. 2
The limits to the Commission’s White Paper’s understanding of governance 
are that the document focuses predominantly on the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the EU decision-making system, while disregarding the issues of democratic 
legitimacy.
Henceforward, the issue is how to improve the legitimacy of the EU. It is 
expected from good governance to bring about improved proximity between 
citizens and European institutions. The principle of subsidiarity has both political 
and instrumentary implications for the distribution of competencies between the 
Member States and the Union. Its political dimension stems from the need to 
tackle democratic deficit and strengthen the link between the citizen and the 
decision-making authority3.
The White Paper makes reference to principles that underpin democratic 
governance and rule of law in the Member States. These principles are: openness, 
participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence which apply to all 
levels of government – European, national, regional and local.
The application of these five principles reinforces the principle of subsidiarity4. 
From the conception of a policy to its implementation, the choice of the level at 
which action is taken (from EU to local) must be in proportion to the objectives 
pursued. This means that before launching a policy initiative, it is essential to 
check systematically if the European level is the most appropriate one5.
The main aim of the study is to highlight how to better apply the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality in the work of the Union’s institutions, regarding 
the preparation of Union legislation and policies. With regard to the attribution 
and the exercise of its competences, how the European Union could involve 
national parliaments and subnational legislative chambers in the preparation 
of Union policies, how the European Union could take better account of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
The 1st section introduces the concept of subsidiarity linking its scope and 
application within the common framework of legitimacy arguments. The 2nd 
section focuses on the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty and the practical application 
of the principle by national parliaments. It shows how through a subsidiarity 
control mechanism (yellow card and orange card procedure) national parliaments 
3 The European Convention. The Secretariat, Working Group I Working document 13, Working 
Group I on the Principle of Subsidiarity, WD 13-WG I, Brussels, 03 September 2002, p. 2.
4 The principle of subsidiarity is defined in Article 3b (now Article 5 (3)) of the Treaty on European 
Union. ’In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and 
in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale 
or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.’
5 European Commission. European Governance – A White Paper COM (2001) 428 final OJ C 287, 
12 October 2001, pp.7-8.
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can collectively fulfil representative and deliberative functions in EU policy-
making. The 3rd section examines the perspectives of a multilevel parliamentary 
system paying special attention to relations and interactions between the 
national and regional parliaments with legislative powers. The last section 
contains conclusions whether the European Union provided a stable institutional 
framework for the monitoring of the principle of subsidiarity and presents some 
ideas for more systematic research agenda on multilevel parliamentary system.
The study is based on the review and analysis of academic research, 
documents and legislative sources of the European Union, extracting and linking 
key findings from existing research and practice.
1 SUBSIDIARITY CONTROL MECHANISM. THE EARLY WARNING 
SYSTEM
European integration has strengthened the executives of nation states. 
Concerns about a growing democratic deficit were addressed through repeated 
and substantial expansion of the powers of the European Parliament, whereas 
national parliaments remained on the margins. According to the Treaty of 
Lisbon6, co-decision is the standard procedure for enacting legislation, and the 
European Parliament now participates on an equal footing with the Council in 
many policy fields. The twofold democratic legitimacy of the Union, as a union 
of citizens and of Member States, is embodied in the EU legislative process by 
the European Parliament besides the Council7.
EU democracy necessarily combines two structures of representation, with 
the direct representation of individual citizens in the European Parliament 
being complemented by the indirect representation of citizens via their national 
parliaments (Benz, 2004, p. 85). National parliaments had long only restricted 
possibilities in the legislation process of the EU, and only the Treaty of Lisbon 
(2009) acknowledges them as institutions contributing to democratic legitimacy 
in a multilevel polity8. Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality (hereinafter Protocol No 2) annexed to the Treaty 
of Lisbon introduced the mechanism of subsidiarity scrutiny by the national 
parliaments of EU Member States on draft legislative proposals. The academic 
6 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007.
7 European Parliament resolution of 16 April 2014 on relations between the European Parliament 
and the national parliaments (2013/2185 (INI)) Strasbourg, 16 April 2014. p. 4.
8 The EU Treaties did formally recognise the role of national parliaments, first through a Declaration 
on the role of national parliaments in the EU (annexed to the Final Act of the Maastricht IGC), then 
in Protocols (annexed to the Treaties by the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties).
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literature on national parliaments in the EU has mirrored these changes (Goetz 
and Meyer-Sahling, 2008; Raunio, 2009; Winzen, 2012).
The concepts of subsidiarity and proportionality are fundamental elements of 
the policy development process of the EU institutions. Subsidiarity is typically 
understood primarily as a principle for allocating powers to different levels 
of governance (Fejes, 2013, p. 25), yet it may also provide guidance on how 
powers are to be exercised. For example, subsidiarity can be thought to include 
an element of proportionality that requires powers to be exercised in a way that 
is not more intrusive for lower levels than alternative ways to achieve the same 
aim. Subsidiarity may also find expression in procedural mechanisms, such as 
the involvement of national parliaments in the application of subsidiarity in the 
EU legislative process9. 
Protocol No 2 contains a legal framework for a reinforced control of 
subsidiarity. The regulation opens up the possibility for national parliaments 
to set out and submit reasoned opinions on draft legislative acts as part of the 
subsidiarity procedure, when legislative proposals concern a policy area that 
falls under shared competence10. The mechanism allowing national parliaments 
to scrutinise the compliance of draft EU legislation with the principle of 
subsidiarity, the early warning system (hereinafter EWS), gives the right to all 
national parliaments to get involved in the EU legislative process11.
In accordance with the Treaty of Lisbon the European Commission, as the main 
author of legislative proposals under its right of initiative, only may put forward 
legislative proposals. All proposals from the European Commission for adoption 
of a legislative act are to be sent to the national parliaments at the same time as 
they are sent to the co-legislators (the Council and the European Parliament). 
‘The Commission shall forward its draft legislative acts and its amended drafts 
to national Parliaments at the same time as to the Union legislator.’
National parliaments may give a reasoned opinion and collectively they 
can influence the legislative process if a certain threshold is attained and in the 
set time limit. Under the early warning mechanism any national parliament or 
any chamber of a national parliament may, within eight weeks from the date of 
9 Legal framework of the subsidiarity control mechanism is based on the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU), Title 2 Art. 12. Procedural details are in the Protocols 1 and 2 annexed to the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
10 According to Article 4 of TFEU these areas cover internal market, social policy, cohesion, 
agriculture and fisheries, environment, consumer protection, transport, trans-European networks, 
energy, freedom, security and justice, as well as certain public health matters.
11 The principle of subsidiarity should be applied during the different stages of the European 
decision-making process, i.e. during the preliminary stage, during the stage of ex-ante political 
monitoring and during the stage of ex-post judicial control. The ex-post judicial review should 
continue to be carried out by the European Court of Justice.
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transmission of a draft legislative act, send to the Presidents of the European 
Commission, the European Parliament and the Council the a reasoned opinion 
stating why it considers that the draft legislative act does not comply with the 
principle of subsidiarity. Under Protocol No 2, each national parliament has two 
votes: in countries with unicameral parliaments the sole House of Parliament 
has two votes, in the case of a bicameral system, each chamber has one vote. 
Commission proposals can be blocked if there is a consensus among a majority 
of chambers. 
In the case of proposals falling under the ordinary legislative procedure, if a 
draft legislative act’s compliance with the subsidiarity principle is contested by a 
third of the votes allocated to national parliaments (yellow card), the Commission 
has to review the proposal and decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the act, 
also giving reasons for its decision. (This threshold shall be a quarter if the draft 
legislative act is submitted within the area of freedom, security and justice.)12 If a 
draft legislative act’s compliance with the subsidiarity principle is contested by a 
simple majority of the votes allocated to national parliaments (orange card), the 
Commission has to justify its position by means of a reasoned opinion.13
The procedural mechanisms are based not only on the interaction between 
national parliaments and the European Commission, but also on the reaction of 
the European Parliament and the Commission. If the European Parliament by 
a simple majority of its members (and the Council by a majority of 55% of its 
members) considers that the proposal is indeed not compatible with the principle 
of subsidiarity, it is abandoned.
The Treaty of Lisbon has introduced an institutional innovation which 
could contribute to lowering the democratic deficit of the European Union. The 
cooperation with EU institutions, especially with the European Commission, on 
EU affairs provides national parliaments with a formal role in European public 
policy-making process. Decision-making involves a great variety of actors, and 
some of them, like the European Commission, clearly play a privileged role. 
In a loosely integrated multilevel system characterized by fragmentation and 
complexity in many instances there is also a need for consensual agreements with 
no exit-options, these patterns are complemented by more flexible arrangements 
of cooperation involving more than just the executive branches (Benz and 
Eberlein, 2011, p. 331).
12 Article 7 of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality 
annexed to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
13 So far, no orange card procedures have been triggered.
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2 KEY CASES WHERE SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY 
CONCERNS WERE RAISED
The strengthening of subsidiarity control mechanism and participation rights 
at both national and European levels is often seen as an effective measure to 
address the perceived democratic deficit in EU decision-making. However, 
whether these aims can be met depends crucially on whether and how national 
parliaments actually do get involved in EU affairs.
Through the early warning system the Treaty of Lisbon gives the right to 
all national parliaments to scrutinise and influence the EU legislative process. 
National parliaments face with the challenges of Europeanized policy-making 
in very different ways and to different degrees. Between 1 January 2010 and 31 
December 2016 national parliaments have raised their concerns by 350 reasoned 
opinions in response to an overall number of 154 Commission proposals (See 
Table 1).
The reasoned opinions issued by national parliaments (both chambers in 
bicameral systems) vary largely, they have different priorities in choosing 
Commission proposals to be scrutinised in the context of the subsidiarity control 
mechanism. Commission proposals and initiatives generated the highest number 
of opinions in 2013 (88).
The Swedish Riksdag has opposed Commission draft legislation on 
subsidiarity grounds more often than any other parliament. From Eastern Europe 
Lithuania, Poland submitted the most reasoned opinions. Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia and Hungary triggered the lowest number of them.
There is a considerable variation across parliamentary chambers as well. 
Some parliamentary chambers have submitted a considerable number of reasoned 
opinions. The lower chamber (Tweede Kamer) of the Dutch parliament, upper 
chamber (Bundesrat) of Austria, Sénat of France, and the House of Lords of the 
UK have submitted large number of reasoned opinions to the Commission.
Parliamentary activity in the early warning system is particularly triggered by 
party political motivation (Gattermann and Hefftler, 2015, p. 307). The different 
political compositions, the intra-party power relations affect the behaviour of 
the pro-European and anti-European parties (Raunio, 2009, p. 5). The different 
constitutional constraints and the parliaments’ different relations with their 
governments have a strong impact on the subsidiarity monitoring process. The 
result is differing levels of parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs and varying 
degrees of willingness to cooperate and conduct subsidiarity checks14.
14 The eight-week deadline is a constraint, through which national parliaments need to make an 
objection within eight weeks of receiving the proposal.
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Table 1: Number of reasoned opinions triggered by national parliaments (2010-
2016)



















Source: processed by the author, based on Annual reports of the European Commission 
on subsidiarity and proportionality, 2010-2016
The key topics to which national parliaments reacted in their opinions vary 
from year to year and reflect the political situation and the interests of national 
parliaments. Under the subsidiarity control mechanism the yellow card procedure 
was used only three times. In May 2012 national parliaments of the EU issued 
their first yellow card. Thus for the first time, national parliaments collectively 
intervened in the legislative process of the EU to decisive effect, expressing 
subsidiarity concerns on the Commission’s proposal for a Regulation on the 
exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services. In 2012 through the case of 
the Monti II proposal national parliaments proved with 12 reasoned opinions that 
the European Commission unnecessarily interfered with domestic labour laws 
including workers’ right to take collective action. The European Commission 
claimed that the Monti II proposal did not breach the subsidiarity principle but 
that it withdrew the draft European legislative act because of a lack of political 
support for it in the European Parliament and the Council.
In November 2013, national parliaments objected to the Commission’s 
proposal to establish a European Public Prosecutor’s Office. National parliaments 
argued that the Commission did not demonstrate that Union level action could 
achieve better results than actions at national level. Finally, on 8 June 2017 under 
enhanced cooperation 20 EU Member States reached a political agreement on 
the establishment of a new European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). 
In May 2016, a third yellow card was issued following the proposal for a 
revision of the directive on the posting of workers, as 14 national parliaments 
or chambers thereof issued reasoned opinions. In this case a „regional block” 
of national parliaments managed to establish closer coordination around one 
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specific topic with shared preferences on the Posted Workers Directive (Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romaniaand Slovakia). Among the 11 national parliaments that submitted 
reasoned opinions these countries all, except Denmark, are from Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
The above cases underline that national parliaments triggered reasoned opinions 
not only in view of legal reasons, but also with regard to political opportunity. 
The way in which most of the national parliaments implement the Protocol No 2 
and use the subsidiarity control mechanism has highlighted the political character 
of the new tool. The political will can stimulate stronger coordination among 
national parliaments which is indispensable and would considerably help to reach 
the threshold. Linked to the more political national democratic processes, national 
parliaments are institutionally well endowed to re-politicise the normative concerns 
in the EU policy-making process (Bartl, 2015, p. 35).
Table 2: Number of yellow card procedures
Year Yellow card procedure







2012 First Yellow card 19 votes 12 abandoned
2013 Second Yellow card 18 votes 14 maintained
2016 Third Yellow card 22 votes 14 maintained
Source: compiled by the author, based on Annual reports of the European Commission 
on subsidiarity and proportionality, 2010-2016
The yellow card procedure is an important development in relations between 
the European Commission and national parliaments. The use of the yellow card 
is a clear expression of the willingness of national parliaments to make their 
opinion expressed in their relations with the Commission on a particular piece 
of legislation15. The Commission withdrew its proposal only once, denying 
any breach of the principle of subsidiarity in 2012, with regard to the right to 
take collective action. The Commission maintained the draft legislative act in 
the second case in 2013 with regard to the establishment of European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office, and in 2016, regarding the revision of the Posting of Workers 
Directive (See Table 2).
15 European Commission. Report from the Comission. Annual Report 2013 on relations between 
the Europen Commission and national parliaments. Brussels, 5.8.2014 COM(2014) 507 final, p. 2.
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The EWS practice, as the yellow card cases have indicated, is that particular 
policy fields had better be regulated at national level instead of European level. 
Moreover, the subsidiarity control on shared public policies can promote a 
regulation which determines what should be European and that should be 
national. All this is full correlation with the simplified revision procedure set 
out in Article 48 (6) of TEU which allows for a return to the Member States of 
competences conferred to the Union16.
The cooperation between the EU institutions and national parliaments in the 
post-Lisbon era became more active and visible than they were in the past. The 
new provisions for parliamentary engagement in the European Union’s policy-
making have brought the national parliaments closer across the EU member 
states. A sizeable number of chambers have chosen to engage with EU affairs as 
a matter of course, have been adapting their internal procedures and institutional 
capacity, and are linking up with other parliaments on a regular basis. However, 
the degree of parliamentary activism remains patchy, which can be explained by 
poor institutional capacity and the actors’ moderate motivation of parliamentary 
involvement in EU affairs (Katrin and Christiansen, 2015, p. 267).
3 DEVELOPMENTS TOWARDS A MULTILEVEL PARLIAMENTARY 
SYSTEM IN THE EU?
The Treaty of Lisbon marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever 
closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly 
as possible and as closely as possible to citizens.
The major novelties regarding subsidiarity affect both the EU institutional 
framework and its procedural mechanisms, and may be considered as a step 
towards a European multilevel and multi-actor parliamentary system (Arribas and 
Bourdin, 2012, p. 13). The related development concerns the vertical relations 
between national parliaments and the European Parliament, the enhanced 
collaboration between national and European levels’ legislatures. Subsidiarity 
control also requires effective mechanisms of exchange of information and 
cooperation among national parliaments and regional parliaments with legislative 
powers. Vertically networked interparliamentary cooperation in the application 
of the subsidiarity control mechanism indirectly supports the democratic quality 
of the European legislation. 
16 On 14 November 2017 the President of the Commission established a Task Force on Subsidiarity, 
Proportionality and ’Doing Less More Efficiently’. The committee on Task Force should make 
a written report to the President of the Commission by 15 July 2018 with recommendations. In: 
Decision of the president of the European Commission on the establishment of a Task Force on 
Subsidiarity, Proportionality and ’Doing Less More Efficiently’. Brussels, 14.11.2017 C(2017) 7810
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National parliaments are able to rely on support from the European 
Parliament. European Parliament is one of the EU institutions which receives 
reasoned opinions issued by national parliaments with regard to scrutiny of the 
principle of subsidiarity (Remác, 2017, p. 33). The European Parliament and 
national parliaments should together determine the promotion of effective and 
regular inter-parliamentary cooperation within the EU.
According to Art. 10 of Protocol No 1 on the role of national parliaments 
in the European Union the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union 
Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC)17 provides an informal 
forum to promote the exchange of information and best practices between the 
European Parliament and national parliaments and may submit contribution it 
deems appropriate for the attention of the European Parliament. 
However, in the discussion about the nature of parliamentary control in the 
EU not much has been said about the role of subnational legislative chambers 
in the post-Lisbon institutional context (Keating and Hooghe, 1996; Jeffery, 
2000). The process of regionalisation of European policies and the rise of the 
regions as new actors in European policy-making produced the novel elements 
of interlacing and interlocking politics (Benz and Eberlein, 2011, p. 342). In this 
regard, the Lisbon Treaty recognises, for the first time, subnational parliaments 
with legislative powers as a separate category of democratic institutions with the 
right to control the European Union legislation. 
The emergence of subsidiarity as a constitutional notion development also 
relates to the system of regionalised states and decentralised administrative 
structures. Protocol No 2 opens up a possibility for consultation of the regional 
parliaments with legislative powers in the early warning system of subsidiarity 
control. Protocol No 2 takes account of the specific features of the Member 
States’ legal orders, stating that ‘It will be for each national Parliament or 
each chamber of a national Parliament to consult, where appropriate, regional 
parliaments with legislative powers’ (Art. 6, Protocol No 2).
The formal recognition of the role of regional parliaments having legislative 
powers in the early warning system could work in decentralised countries with 
bicameral legislature or regional assemblies in eight EU Member States (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom)18. It 
17 COSAC ’...may submit any contribution it deems appropriate for the attention of the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission.’ (Art. 10 of Protocol No 1)
18 A total of 74 subnational parliaments from eight Member States are affected by the EWS. There 
is only one regional parliament with legislative powers in an otherwise unitary Member State (such 
is the case for the Åland Island in Finland). There are numerous regional parliaments in a fully-
fledged federal system (as in Germany or Austria), where the second chamber serves as a body 
for territorial representation. In a reginalized systems regional parliaments have different degrees 
of sovereignty (as in Spain or UK). In: Committee of the Regions (2013). The Subsidiarity Early 
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is assumed that cooperative relations between subnational parliaments will lead 
to a stronger subnational parliamentary mobilization under the EWS and will help 
the latter one to perform its EU scrutiny function better and to become an active 
interlocutor in contacts with a national parliament (Borońska-Hryniewiecka, 
2013, p. 13; Committee of the Regions, 2013). However, because of the low-
profile of regions, at present, only a very low percentage of regions and regional 
parliaments are active in conducting subsidiarity checks. Regional parliaments 
do not formally participate in the EWS. Thus far no formal mechanisms have 
been established to integrate regional actors into the subsidiarity monitoring 
process (Fink, 2015; Fromage, 2016.).
The subsidiarity principle, as laid down in the Treaty on European Union 
(Article 5(3)), explicitly contains local and regional dimensions and thus 
underlines the necessity to respect competences of local and regional authorities 
within the EU19. The recognition of the role of the subnational levels in the 
European integration process is taking into account the local and regional 
dimensions in the area of subsidiarity controls. European subnational authorities 
can express their views on compliance with the principles of subsidiartiy and 
proportionality during the legislative phase. The Committee of the Regions20 
carries out monitoring activities via the Subsidiarity Monitoring Network. The 
network provides additional exchange of information between local and regional 
authorities and the EU institutions on legislative proposals and can give an „early 
warning” about EU legislative proposals that may be relevant for subsidiarity 
scrutiny (Arribas and Bourdin, 2013, p. 16).
The innovations of the Treaty of Lisbon focus on strengthening democratic 
scrutiny at all levels of EU policy-making. The subsidiarity control mechanism 
has made the legislative process more transparent and has further enriched the 
discussions. Incorporation of regional and local levels only can lead to a more 
balanced allocation of powers between actors of the European polity, but they 
also can contribute to increase democratic control due to their proximity to 
citizens.
The emerging multilevel parliamentary structure is of particular significance 
in a multilevel representative democracy. Undoubtedly, inter-parliamentary 
Warning System of the Lisbon Treaty – the role of regional parliaments with legislative powers and 
other subnational authorities. Brussels: European Union.
19 Comittee of the Regions: White paper on multilevel governance. Brussels, 17 and 18 June, 2009. 
CdR 89/2009 final p. 3.
Local and regional authorities are closely involved in shaping and implementing EU strategies, 
since they implement nearly 70 % of Community legislation. 
20 Committee of the Regions, whose members are representatives of regional and local bodies 
who either hold a regional or local authority electoral mandate or are politically accountable to an 
elected assembly.
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relations induced by the subsidiarity control procedure have an outstanding 
importance. However, there is more to be done.
The national parliaments should recognise the importance of a more structured 
cooperation during the checking of the principle of subsidiarity, throughout the 
legislative process they must keep each other regularly informed about their work 
and on-going negotiations among them. Lack of coordination would make the 
reasoned opinions a rather weak instrument to put pressure on the Commission 
(Daukšienė and Matijošaitytė, 2012, p. 41).
Similarly, national parliaments are not bound yet by the positions on 
subsidiarity expressed by the regional parliaments. In spite of the formal 
acknowledgement of the regional level in the EWS, the Protocol No 2 has not 
made the consultations with regional parliaments obligatory, but has left it to 
the discretion of the national chambers. Important warning signals for national 
parliaments that in 2016 some regional parliaments took the opportunity to 
directly inform the Commission of their opinions on certain Commission 
proposals, which in some instances had also been submitted to their respective 
national parliamentary chambers as part of the subsidiarity scrutiny procedure21.
Legitimacy must be ensured both at national and European levels by the 
national parliaments and the European Parliament. Nevertheless, the general 
objective is to ensure democratic legitimacy at all levels at which decisions are 
taken and implemented. The extension of the principle of subsidiarity to the local 
and regional actors might also create new possibilities for subsidiarity disputes. 
It might provide some national parliaments with an additional incentive to 
become more involved in EU affairs which is an important development towards 
strengthening democratic legitimacy. 
CONCLUSIONS
The study is intended as a contribution to important and ongoing debates 
whether the European integration process strengthens the multilevel 
parliamentary system. It takes the power relationship between levels of policy-
making. In general, the multilevel parliamentary system is in a weaker position 
vis-à-vis executives. European policy-making and legislation would continue 
to be dominated by executives. In the multilevel polity of the European Union 
citizens are represented in the Council by their national governments, while 
representatives of national communities are represented in the European 
Parliament and by their national parliaments.
21 Europen Commission. Report from the Commission. Annual Report 2016 on subsidiarity and 
proportionality. Brussels, 30.6.2017 COM (2017) 600 final p. 8. 
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1. The interaction of Europeanization triggered processes of differentiation of 
interparliamentary decision-making structures. It has never been more important 
that national parliaments should play a full and active role, both individually 
and collectively. Through COSAC this process of differentiation emerges 
as the primary precondition for the successful management of a multilevel 
parliamentary system. The greater weight of the parliamentary component in 
the EU decision-making system, as provided for in the Lisbon Treaty, primarily 
concerns the role of the national parliaments in monitoring the implementation 
of the subsidiarity principle. The effective involvement of national parliaments 
is fundamental to ensuring that there is accountability, and legitimacy, for the 
actions of the Union.
2. The early warning mechanism works in decentralised countries with 
bicameral legislature or regional assemblies, although the role of the latter is 
rather limited. However, in more centralised Member States the level closer to 
the citizens will have to be the national. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the ex-ante 
monitoring role of the regional parliaments has been strengthened regarding the 
control over the subsidiarity principle. It calls on the national parliaments to 
consult the regional parliaments with legislative powers, and on the Commission 
to pay attention to the role of the latter. The national and regional parliamentary 
involvement improves the overall democratic legitimacy of the EU. 
3. The subsidiarity control mechanism can also be used as a tool for a better 
consultation in order to identify specific concerns and expectations of the citizens 
or local and regional authorities in unitary states. In addition towards emerging 
a multilevel parliamentary system in the post-Lisbon era an explicit reference 
has been made for the first time to the regional and local levels concerning the 
subsidiarity principle. 
4. The subsidiarity control mechanism aims to improve the way the EU 
legislates, and to ensure that EU legislation better serves citizens. Regional and 
local authorities across Europe are important contributors towards the recognition 
of a multi-parliamentary system in the European Union. A more inclusive Europe 
requires better involvement of regional and local expertise in the quest for an 
increased democratic control.
In sum, the subsidiarity early warning mechanism has proven to be a valuable 
tool in the policy development process of the multilevel parliamentary system 
in the EU. The increased role given to the national and subnational legislative 
chambers in the monitoring of subsidiarity is a positive development, and 
significant step forward the increased democratic control.
Nevertheless, the early warning procedure is not the most suitable tool to 
decrease a democratic deficit and improve the EU democratic legitimacy, 
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because national parliaments directly participate in European policy-making 
only in policy fields on subsidiarity and concerning their role among other actors 
in European politics, they probably will remain in a weak position.
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